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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARK PLASKON, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No, 20000066-CA 
v. 
CRAIG DEARDEN, Commissioner, : 
Department of Public Safety, 
State of Utah; ROBERT : 
BRINKMAN, Bureau Chief, Crime 
Laboratory, Department of : Priority No. 15 
Public Safety, State of Utah; 
and THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Defendants/Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from an Order of Dismissal of the Third 
Judicial District Court, filed December 20, 1999 (R. 138-39), 
granting defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff!s claims of 
defamation and interference with prospective economic relations 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(R. 38-39). The claims arose from plaintiff's termination from 
probationary state employment more than 11 years before he 
initiated the present action. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of 
appeal from the Order of Dismissal on January 19, 2000 (R. 140). 
By order of transfer from the Supreme Court of Utah dated May 18, 
2 000, this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Plaintiff's appeal raises only the question whether the 
district court erred in ruling that, under Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992), a "continuing wrong" 
theory was inapplicable to plaintiff's cause of action for the 
purpose of extending the relevant statute of limitations. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The applicability of a decided case to 
the controversy before the trial court is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. 4447 Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin., 1999 
UT App 013, 1|9, 973 P.2d 992; see also State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 
857, 858 (Utah 1994); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 
P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996); Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994). Further, "[t]he propriety 
of a dismissal based on Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a question of 
law; therefore we review the district court's ruling for 
correctness." Stokes v. Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, 1(6, 987 P. 2d 602; 
see also Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the issue before the Court is contained in 
the body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this lawsuit on 
February 11, 1998 (R. 1-7), alleging causes of action in 
defamation and "unlawful business interference" (R. 1, K 1). The 
complaint was not served on defendants. On June 30, 1998, an 
amended complaint was filed (R. 10-16), correcting an internal 
inconsistency between paragraphs 2 and 10 of the original 
complaint regarding the length of plaintiff's probationary 
employment (compare R. 1-2, H 2, and 4, H 10; R. 10, f 2, and 
12-13, % 10) and raising plaintiff's requests for compensatory 
and punitive damages from one million to ten million dollars each 
(R. 6 and 15, prayer for relief, Uf 3-4). A s with the original 
complaint, plaintiff failed to serve the amended complaint on 
defendants, instead filing a second amended complaint on 
September 23, 1998 (R. 17-23), which added a new paragraph.il 
asserting that defendants had failed to advise him of rights to 
the administrative review of his termination from employment and 
that he had been found entitled to an award of employment 
compensation over defendants' opposition (R. 20). Neglecting to 
serve defendants with this second amended complaint, plaintiff 
again amended the complaint on January 19, 1999 (R. 24-31), newly 
alleging a claim based on the asserted public accessibility of 
his employment records under the Governmental Records Access and 
Management Act (GRAMA), Title 3, Chapter 62 of the Utah Code, 
3 
enacted some five years after plaintiff's termination (R. 29, 
H 21). He made timely service of this third amended complaint on 
defendants (R. 32-37) . 
Defendants responded with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
(R. 3 8-39), supported by a memorandum (R. 4 0-82). The memorandum 
pointed out various jurisdictional and procedural flaws in the 
complaint in addition to identifying prior suits plaintiff had 
litigated with respect to the same set of facts. Following 
plaintiff's response (R. 83-112) and supplemental briefing by 
both parties (R. 123-27 (plaintiff) and 128-35 (defendants)), the 
court entered its order of dismissal (R. 138-39) on December 20, 
1999 "for the reasons set forth in Defendants' memoranda in 
support and in reply" (R. 139). Plaintiff filed a timely notice 
of appeal on January 19, 2000 (R. 140). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Plaintiff was hired to work as a questioned document 
examiner in the Utah Department of Safety's crime laboratory, 
where defendant Brinkman was his immediate supervisor (Third 
Amended Complaint, R. 24, H 2.) While plaintiff was still on 
probationary status, he was repeatedly warned about problems with 
his performance. In a May 28, 1986 memorandum given to 
plaintiff, which plaintiff refused to acknowledge by signing, Mr. 
Brinkman noted that plaintiff had engaged in insubordination by 
declining to follow specific instructions regarding his work 
4 
priorities (Exh. D to plaintiff's memorandum opposing motion to 
dismiss, R. 95 and 110). The memorandum also stated: 
You have been talked to extensively in the past 
for this behavior. This memo is to be considered a 
written reprimand which will be placed in your 
permanent personnel file. 
This is also notice that should we experience this 
behavior at any time in the future, it will be grounds 
for dismissal. 
R. 95 and 110. On June 23, 1986, plaintiff received an Employee 
Performance Appraisal Form, which noted continuing performance 
problems, including "lack of cooperation, sarcasm and resistence 
to authority" (Exh. C to plaintiff's memorandum opposing motion 
to dismiss, R. 93 and 108). Plaintiff refused to sign the 
appraisal form. Plaintiff did not successfully complete his 
probation, and prior to its expiration, he was advised by letter, 
dated August 19, 1986 and served on him two days later, of his 
termination from employment effective August 24, 1986 (Third 
Amended Complaint, R. 26, % 10; Exh. B to plaintiff's memorandum 
opposing motion to dismiss, R. 91-92 and 106-07) . The 
termination was based on "numerous occasions" of counseling by 
his supervisors "in the areas of relations with co-workers, 
relations with your supervisors, the attitude which you display 
toward your case work and conforming to the rules and policies of 
the Laboratory and of the Department" (R. 91 and 106), as well as 
on two "below standard" performance appraisals (id.). The letter 
correctly advised plaintiff that "[u]nder Utah law, there is no 
appeal process for probationary employees" (id.). 
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On August 24, 1988, plaintiff filed a complaint in Third 
District Court against the State of Utah, defendant Brinkman, and 
John T. Nielson, then Commissioner of the Utah Department of 
Public Safety ("DPS") (Exh. A to defendants' memorandum 
supporting motion to dismiss, R. 52-59; see also Addendum A, 
attached). The case was dismissed without prejudice (R. 60). A 
second suit with substantially identical allegations, also 
brought in Third District Court, was filed on June 15, 1990 
against the same defendants (Exh. B to defendants' memorandum 
supporting motion to dismiss, R. 62-67; see also Addendum B, 
attached), and was likewise dismissed without prejudice (R. 69) 
for failure to serve. On March 6, 1995, plaintiff filed suit in 
federal district court, substituting Douglas Bodrero for John T. 
Nielson as DPS Commissioner and amending the complaint before 
service (see Addendum C, attached; see also Second Amended 
Complaint, Civil No. 95CV210W, Exh. C to defendants' memorandum 
supporting motion to dismiss, R. 73-79). The complaint had the 
same factual basis as the prior state complaints, but added an 
allegation that unfair statements by defendants regarding his 
work skills, made in documents contained in his personnel file, 
prohibited him from obtaining employment with the Web€>r State 
University Crime Laboratory (R. 78, K 20). In addition to 
defamation and unlawful interference claims, the federal suit 
also raised a Title VII claim for discrimination in employment 
(R. 73, 1 1). The federal court dismissed all claims with 
prejudice by order dated March 4, 1997 (see Exh. C to defendants' 
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memorandum supporting motion to dismiss, R. 80), reaffirming by 
subsequent order the merit of defendants' articulated grounds for 
dismissal and denying plaintiff's request for a non-prejudicial 
dismissal of his state causes of action (R. 80-81). No appeal 
was taken from this final order. 
The present lawsuit ensued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff seeks to avoid the multiple procedural and 
jurisdictional defects of his suit by invoking a continuing 
violation theory based on Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) In Retherford, the Supreme Court of Utah 
reversed summary judgment for defendants on statute of 
limitations grounds in an action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The court held that because of the 
cumulative nature of retaliatory harassment, it could not rule as 
a matter of law that Retherford's cause of action accrued at the 
time she first complained of her coworkers' retaliatory actions, 
which was beyond the applicable statute of limitations. The 
court focused on the subjective nature of the element of 
plaintiff's extreme emotional distress and the difficulty in 
establishing the time of its accrual, observing that the leave of 
absence she ultimately took as a result of defendants' ongoing 
acts of harassment fell within the limitations period. By 
contrast, no such subjective element is present in the case at 
bar. Plaintiff's cause of action accrued, at the latest, when he 
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was made aware of unfavorable reports and reviews or when he was 
terminated on the grounds they documented. Plaintiff has 
articulated no reason to extend the four-year general statute of 
limitations to more than a decade after these events took place. 
Moreover, the claims made in the present suit have already 
been litigated to decision on the merits by the parties or their 
privies in plaintiff's federal lawsuit, which resulted in a 
dismissal with prejudice of all claims. Res judicata prevents 
their relitigation here. 
Finally, plaintiff has not followed the strictures of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act in commencing his action. Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1997), the act requires that a notice 
of claim be filed within one year of the asserted cause of 
action. The claim is deemed denied if no contrary action is 
taken within 90 days. If plaintiff relies on his original notice 
of claim, allegedly filed on or before August 24, 1987 (R. 56, 
H 16), then the present suit has not been timely commenced within 
one year of the claim's denial or deemed denial. If, instead, 
plaintiff relies on his allegedly amended notice of claim dated 
August 21, 1998 (R. 96-97 and 111-12),x the notice falls outside 
the one-year period measured from the time the cause of action 
XA June 26, 1997 notice of claim purportedly attached to the 
original, amended, and second amended complaints does not appear 
of record. Moreover, since the third amended complaint, the only 
one served on defendants, does not refer to it, it is not at 
issue in the present appeal. Additionally, plaintiff's 
memorandum opposing defendants' motion to dismiss specifically 
relies on and attaches only the amended notice of claim dated 
August 21, 1998. In any event, neither date would be timely. 
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arose. Moreover, the present suit was commenced with the filing 
of the original complaint on February 11, 1998, fully six months 
before the date of the amended notice and therefore in violation 
of statute. Plaintiff has articulated no argument addressing 
these determinative procedural and jurisdictional errors. 
As noted in defendants1 memorandum supporting their motion 
to dismiss, plaintiff's complaint, read broadly, may have 
attempted to articulate claims under various other legal 
theories, including employment discrimination under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, disability discrimination, civil 
rights violations under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Supp. 2000), and even 
constitutional due process violations (see R. 43-46) . 
Defendants' arguments for the dismissal of these possible claims 
were adopted by the district court in its order granting 
dismissal "for the reasons set forth in Defendants' memoranda in 
support and in reply" (R. 13 9) and stand as independent grounds 
supporting the court's decision. Because plaintiff has failed to 
address these issues, they are deemed waived for purposes of 
appeal and will not be further addressed in this brief. 
Plaintiff admits that his reliance on Retherford is placed 
solely on dicta contained in a footnote (see Aplt. Brief at 7). 
Given the multiple grounds supporting the district court's 
decision, plaintiff's argument is too slender a reed to bear the 
weight of reversal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S SUIT IS BARRED BY JURISDICTIONAL AND 
PROCEDURAL ERRORS UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT. 
"The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a 
question of law which [the appellate court] review[s] for 
correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal 
conclusions." Gutierrez v.' Medley, 972 P. 2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 
1998); see also State v. Martin, 1999 UT App 062, 1|7, 976 P.2d 
1224. The trial court correctly adopted defendants' contention 
that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act barred plaintiff's 
claims, and plaintiff has mounted no argument to the contrary. 
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint states, "This is an 
action for defamation and unlawful business interference" (R. 24, 
H i ) . The complaint names as defendants Craig Dearden, 
Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety; Robert 
Brinkman, Bureau Chief of the Department's crime laboiratory; and 
the State of Utah. Because the articulated claims lie against 
the State--a governmental entity as defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-2 (1997 and Supp. 1999)--and its employees, acting within 
the scope of their employment, the case is governed by the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Plaintiff has not argued that the act does not control his 
case.2 In fact, his first three complaints in this case 
2
"Issues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and 
abandoned." American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical, 
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5 (Utah 1996); see also Pixton v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 
10 
specifically invoke the act by stating that "[o]n or about June 
26, 1997, a notice of claim against the State of Utah was filed, 
a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof by 
reference" (R. 6, 15, and 22, % 21) .3 Moreover, he has not 
alleged that the defendant employees acted with fraud or malice, 
the only grounds on which he could bring an action against them 
other than under the Governmental Immunity Act, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. 63-30-4(3) (1997). His sole identification of 
defendants is in their capacities as employees of the state 
(R. 24, H i ) . 
Section 63-30-3(1) of the act provides governmental entities 
immunity from suit for, among other things, "any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental function." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (1997). The act defines a governmental 
function as 
any act, failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the 
act, failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking is characterized as governmental, 
proprietary, a core government function, unique to 
government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to 
or not essential to a government or governmental 
function, or could be performed by private enterprise 
or private persons. 
1991) ("Generally, where an appellant fails to brief an issue on 
appeal, the point is waived"). 
3See n.l, supra. No such attachment appears in the district 
court record. However, plaintiff does provide an "Amended Notice 
of Claim Against Government Entity" dated August 21, 1998 as 
Exhibit E to his memorandum opposing defendants1 motion to 
dismiss (R. 96-97 and 111-12). The memorandum contains no 
reference to a notice of claim dated June 26, 1997. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1997 and Supp. 1999). 
Additionally, "[a] 'governmental function1 may be performed by 
any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a 
governmental entity.11 Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 (4) (b) (1997 and 
Supp. 1999) . 
Section 63-30-10 (1997) retains immunity for injuries caused 
by employees' negligent acts or omissions, including '"libel, 
slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of 
mental anguish, or violation of civil rights." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(2) (1997). It likewise retains immunity for "a 
misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent 
or intentional." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(6) (1997). 
Plaintiff's allegations of defendants' false and misleading 
statements and defamation, all of which plaintiff asserts have 
prevented him from obtaining employment in his chosen field, 
clearly fit within these categories. Because immunity for these 
actions is retained, plaintiff's defamation-based claims could 
not go forward under the act even if plaintiff had complied with 
all procedural and jurisdictional requirements of the immunity 
act. However, he did not do so. 
Both statute and precedent make clear that a timely notice 
of claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under the act. 
Section 63-30-12 states that 
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee 
for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of [his/the employee's] duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the [relevant 
authorities] within one year after the claim arises, or 
12 
before any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1997 and Supp. 1999). As the supreme 
court has consistently held, failure to give the required notice 
is grounds for dismissal. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 
UT 36, Kl8# 977 P.2d 1201 ("To bring suit against a governmental 
entity for an injury, a party must file a written notice of claim 
with that entity. Failure to file such notice deprives the court 
of subject matter jurisdiction") (citation omitted); see also 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988). This Court 
applied the supreme court's Madsen holding in Lamarr v. Utah 
State Department of Transportation, 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah App. 
1992), citing to Madsen and stating, "[T]he supreme court has 
held the statutory notice requirement is a jurisdictional 
requirement and a precondition to suit." 
Once a timely notice of claim has been filed, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-14 (1997) gives a governmental entity 90 days in which to 
approve or deny it. If no action is taken within that period, 
the claim is deemed denied. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15(2) 
(1997), a suit following this denial period must be commenced 
within one year of its expiration. 
Plaintiff's original notice of claim, allegedly filed "on or 
before August 24, 1987" (R. 56), was timely as to his 1986 
termination. However, it cannot serve to sustain the present 
suit, filed nearly a decade later, well past the one-year statute 
of limitations. The alleged notice of June 26, 1997 (see R. 6, 
13 
15, and 22, t 21) appears nowhere of record, even though 
plaintiff claims to have attached it to his original, first 
amended, and second amended complaints in this action., Moreover, 
the complaint at issue here, the Third Amended Complaint, does 
not refer to it. The amended notice plaintiff claims to have 
filed on August 21, 1998 (R. 96-97 and 111-12) is based on events 
that took place in 1986 and is therefore not timely. Even if it 
were timely as to the claims asserted therein, it does not 
satisfy the precondition requirement because this suit was 
commenced by the filing of the original complaint more than six 
months before the date of the amended notice. Plaintiff has not 
cited, and defendants1 research has not disclosed, any authority 
suggesting that a default of timely notice can be cured by notice 
given subsequent to the initiation of a legal action. In fact, 
under Rushton, even " [a]ctual notice does not cure a party's 
failure to meet these [notice] requirements." Rushton, 1999 UT 
36, i[l9; see also Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666, 672 n.9 (Utah 
App. 1994); Litster v. Utah Valley Community College, 881 P.2d 
933, 938 (Utah App. 1994). To accept a tardy notice of claim 
would gut the very purpose of notice: "to provide the 
governmental entity an opportunity to correct the condition that 
caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the 
matter without the expense of litigation." Larson v. Park City 
Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998); see also Bellonio 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Utah App. 1996). 
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In short, the deficiencies of plaintiff's pleadings, as 
revealed in the record, fully support the district court's 
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. Whether or not the court 
relied on these particular grounds for its order of dismissal, 
they are also sufficient for affirmance of the district court's 
decision.4 
II. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY BOTH THE CLAIM 
PRECLUSION AND ISSUE PRECLUSION BRANCHES OF RES 
JUDICATA. 
Plaintiff suggests that the case at bar stands in the same 
procedural posture as Retherford. He correctly states that the 
Retherford court "dismissed the Federal claims with prejudice, as 
being untimely, and dismissed the State claims without prejudice 
for lack of pendant [sic] jurisdiction" (Aplt. Brief at 5-6). He 
then cautions the Court to "note that this procedural history is 
very similar to the present case" (id. at 6). A review of the 
series of lawsuits plaintiff has pursued with respect to the 
facts that underlie this case shows otherwise. 
Plaintiff initially filed suit in Third District Court in 
1988 (R. 52-59 and Addendum A, attached). The complaint was not 
served on defendants and was subsequently dismissed without 
prejudice (R. 60). He filed a second case in Third District 
Court in 1990, which he again failed to serve (R. 62-67 and 
4A reviewing court "may affirm a trial court's decision on 
any reasonable legal basis, provided that any rationale for 
affirmance finds support in the record." State v. Heaton, 958 
P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998); see also White v. Deseelhorst, 879 
P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994) ("[W]e may affirm the judgment on any 
ground, even one not relied upon by the trial court"). 
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Addendum B, attached). This suit was likewise dismissed without 
prejudice (R. 59) for failure to serve defendants. In 1995, he 
filed a third action, this time in federal district court 
(R. 73-79 and Addendum C, attached), making service on 
defendants, who filed a motion to dismiss (see Addendum C, 
entries for December 30, 1996) . The motion was granted and all 
claims were dismissed with prejudice (see R. 80). The federal 
court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion to set aside the 
dismissal with prejudice as to the state claims, finding no 
grounds that would justify such action and reaffirming the 
grounds for dismissal as meritorious (R. 81). Plaintiff took no 
appeal from the court's decision. Consequently, the decision 
operates as an adjudication on the merits of the case,5 barring 
the present claims as res judicata.6 "The application of res 
judicata is a question of law, reviewed for correctness with no 
deference given to the trial court." J.M. v. State, 1999 UT App 
238, 1115, 986 P.2d 115; see also State, Office of Recovery Servs, 
v. V.G.P.. 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App. 1992). 
5See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b): "Unless the court in its order 
for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision [involuntary dismissal] and any dismissal not 
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party 
under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits." 
Plaintiff has not argued that any of these exceptions apply to 
the dismissal of his federal case. His state claims, therefore, 
were dismissed on the merits, activating the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
6As with the issue of the Governmental Immunity Act's 
procedural and jurisdictional requisites, the issue of res 
judicata has not been briefed by appellant and is therefore 
waived for purposes of appeal. See n.2, supra. 
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The term "res judicata" comprises two distinct legal 
doctrines: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Under the 
first branch, 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if 
the suit in which that cause of action is being 
asserted and the prior suit satisfy three requirements. 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or 
their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be 
barred must have been presented in the first suit or 
must be one that could and should have been raised in 
the first action. Third, the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Madsen, 769 P.2d at 247. In issue preclusion, or collateral 
estoppel, 
the adjudication of an issue bars its relitigation in 
another action only if four requirements are met. 
First, the issue in both cases must be identical. 
Second, the judgment must be final with respect to that 
issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly, 
and competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, 
the party who is precluded from litigating the issue 
must be either a party to the first action or a privy 
of a party. 
Id. at 250. 
In this case, both branches of res judicata are satisfied. 
The plaintiff here was also the plaintiff in the federal case and 
is the party who is to be precluded from relitigating his state 
claims. The State and Robert Brinkman, defendants here, were 
also defendants in the federal case. The third federal 
defendant, Douglas Bodrero, preceded present defendant Craig 
Dearden as Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety 
and these parties are consequently in privity. The state claims 
presented in the federal case are virtually identical to the 
claims raised in the case at bar: "an action for defamation and 
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unlawful interference with Plaintiff's ability to pursue his 
chosen profession" (R. 73, f 1) based on the allegation "[t]hat 
subsequent to the Plaintiff leaving employment with the State of 
Utah, he has attempted to obtain employment in the area of crime 
scene investigation, document examination and other forensic 
fields and has consistently been denied employment based upon the 
false reports generated from the Defendants" (R. 28, % 17 
(present suit); R. 78, H 18 (federal suit)). Even the most 
recent instance of alleged defamation and interference with 
prospective employment, the denial of employment with the crime 
laboratory at Weber State University in 1995, is the same in both 
cases (see R. 28-29, H 19 (present suit); R. 78, H 20 (federal 
suit)). In their allegations that plaintiff has "consistently 
been denied employment" on the basis of defendants1 statements 
(R. 28, H 17 (present suit); R. 78, K 18)), both suits allege an 
ongoing violation. The parties fully litigated these state 
issues to conclusion on the merits in the federal suit, as 
explained above, and a decision on the merits was rendered in 
defendants1 favor, from which plaintiff took no appeal. Even if 
they had not been so litigated, the factual similarities in the 
two cases show that the state issues could have and should have 
been raised in the federal case. Given the identity of the 
parties, facts, and issues, plaintiff cannot escape the 
application of res judicata to his claims here. 
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III. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ARTICULATED A "CONTINUING 
WRONG" THAT WOULD SUPPORT JURISDICTION OF HIS CLAIMS. 
Plaintiff's sole argument for the timeliness of his claims 
is based on a footnote in Retherford which he acknowledges in his 
brief "is dicta and is not a part of the holding of the case, and 
therefore the case does not provide any precedential value for 
this Court" (Aplt. Brief at 7). In light of the procedural, 
jurisdictional, and res judicata hurdles that plaintiff has 
failed to overcome, this argument cannot support the weight of 
reversal. 
The Retherford court suggested three factors to be 
considered in determining the existence of a continuing 
violation: (1) subject matter, (2) frequency, and (3) 
permanence. See 844 P.2d at 976 n.18. The circumstances of 
plaintiff's case do not fulfill these criteria. 
As to subject matter, the inquiry involves whether all 
alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination. Plaintiff 
has alleged no discrete acts since his denial of employment by 
the Weber State University Crime Laboratory in 1995 that have 
resulted in discrimination against him. He argues only that 
"[o]bviously Petitioner's allegations of disseminating untrue 
information about him over a period of years qualifies" (Aplt. 
Brief at 7). He has identified neither specific statements nor 
specific parties to whom such statements were disclosed after the 
1995 incident, which was litigated to conclusion on the merits in 
his prior federal case. Relying only on the 1995 incident 
subjects his complaint to dismissal for lack of a timely notice 
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of claim and on grounds of res judicata, as discussed in Points I 
and II, above. 
Petitioner fares no better with the frequency factor. His 
complete argument, after asserting that the factor favors his 
position, is as follows: "They are not isolated incidents, but 
continuing incidents that extend over a number of years of making 
his file available through GRAMMA [sic] and other reporting 
services so that any potential employer could review the 
documents" (Aplt. Brief at 7). Again, these allegedly 
"continuing incidents" are unidentified other than the 
asserted--and litigated--1995 disclosure to Weber State 
University. Moreover, there is no evidence of record that 
negative documents were added to his personnel file subsequent to 
his separation from state employment in 1986--some five years 
before the Governmental Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA) 
became effective in 1991. The continuing existence of negative 
documents, especially in the absence of demonstrated new 
publication, cannot sustain a finding of frequency simply on the 
basis of continued availability. 
Russell v. McMillen, a case cited to support the application 
of a "continuing wrong" theory in Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 
1357, 1377-78 (Utah App. 1993) (Orme, J., concurring in the 
result), is instructive on this point. Russell was a Colorado 
libel case in which a series of newspaper articles, published 
beginning on October 6, 1976, allegedly libeled the plaintiff. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals recognized that "[a] cause of 
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action in libel accrues when the defamatory statements are 
published. And, each separate publication constitutes a separate 
and distinct claim for libel." Russell v. McMillen, 685 P.2d 
255, 258 (Colo. App. 1984). Nonetheless, the court held 
Russell's claims barred as to the 1976 articles by his failure to 
file his libel complaint within the one-year statute of 
limitations. The mere existence and presumably continuing 
availability of the 1976 articles to public scrutiny did not 
render the violation "continuing" as to those articles for 
limitations purposes. Plaintiff's situation is similar. He had 
an opportunity to challenge the allegedly defamatory documents 
when he first became aware of them, or, at the latest, when he 
became aware in 1995 that they were being disclosed to 
prospective employers. See R. 28-29, H 19, in which plaintiff 
admits that in the process of applying for employment with Weber 
State University, he 
was advised that reports emanating from the Defendants 
question his competence, his integrity and his ability 
to work with people, all of which serve to perpetuate 
an unfair and invalid profile of the Plaintiff, which 
in the highly competitive area of criminalistic, [sic] 
prohibits him from obtaining employment and has thus 
far prohibited him from obtaining employment at the 
Weber State University Crime Lab. 
Just as the continuing availability of the newspaper articles to 
public scrutiny did not save Russell's action, the continued 
availability of plaintiff's personnel file does not constitute a 
"continuing wrong" that overcomes the relevant statute of 
limitations. 
21 
In the Retherford court's three-factor analysis, "[t]he 
third factor, perhaps of most importance, is degree of 
permanence." Retherford, 844 P.2d at 976 n.18 (quoting Berry v. 
Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983)). The 
relevant inquiry is as follows: 
Does the act have the degree of permanence which should 
trigger an employeefs awareness of and duty to assert 
his or her rights, or which should indicate to the 
employee that the continued existence of the adverse 
consequences of the act is to be expected without being 
dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate? 
Id. While plaintiff disavows knowledge of the contents of his 
personnel file until "two years ago" (Aplt. Brief at 7), he has 
not addressed his own representation that he was aware of 
negative documents in his file that were made available to Weber 
State University in 1995. Under the Retherford dicta, this event 
should have put him on notice that the continued existence of the 
documents could be expected to result in adverse consequences 
regardless of a continued discriminatory intent on defendants' 
part. Plaintiff's August 21, 1998 notice of claim was untimely 
with respect to this factor, and, as explained in detail above, 
requires dismissal of his suit-
Retherford simply does not support the result plaintiff 
wishes to reach: an avoidance of the statute of limitations 
despite his demonstrated prior awareness of his asserted harm. 
Plaintiff admits that Retherford is not of precedential value in 
his suit. Defendants submit that even if the Court were inclined 
to adopt the dicta contained in Retherford's footnote 18, the 
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facts of the case at bar neither compel nor justify its 
application here. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a "continuing wrong" 
that would warrant an extension of the statute of limitations in 
his case. There is no subjective element in his claims that 
would require determination by a trier of fact. The uncontested, 
objective facts, as pleaded by plaintiff, show that he was aware 
of defendants' statements as long ago as the time of his 
termination from state employment in 1986. He was certainly 
aware of their dissemination by 1995, when he was rejected for 
employment by the Weber State University Crime Laboratory, and, 
in fact, litigated the matter to decision on the merits in 
federal district court. He cannot now be heard to claim, on the 
same factual basis, that he was unaware of the permanent 
implications of defendants' statements. Nor can he escape his 
own failures to follow the procedural requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act in order to protect his rights. 
The record supports the district court's dismissal of 
plaintiff's action on multiple grounds which plaintiff's 
rationale does not overcome. For this reason, as more fully 
explained above, defendants respectfully request the Court to 
affirm the trial court's dismissal of this case. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Defendants/appellees believes the law is sufficiently clear 
that neither oral argument nor a published opinion is necessary 
in this case. However, they wish to participate if oral argument 
is ordered by the Court. 
Dated this «fl£^ day of July, 2000. 
Nancy L,\ Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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